2. 1. Explaining Algeria’s descent into violence

 Algeria experienced a political impasse in the mid 1980s, which exploded violently in the 1990s. Scholars have presented many theories to explain the violence that prevailed in Algeria: bankruptcy; the failure of the economic policies; political corruption; authoritarian policies; and the social crisis. The war had three main phases. 

1.1. First Phase: Suspension of the electoral process:

 On 9 February 1992, the military rulers in Algeria announced a state of emergency and suspended the electoral process, as the Front for Islamic Salvation (FIS) had been on the verge of triumphing at the ballot box. 6 Top-rank officers, mainly Khaled Nezzar, justified that decision as a way to protect the principles of the republic against the autocratic FIS project. It was largely presumed that the FIS embraced a radical doctrine and an extremist tone that challenged the post-independence regime. It is true that the FIS’s leading figures, such as Ali Belhadj, had asserted that Sharia was the only source for legitimacy and knowledge. Nevertheless, the interruption of the electoral process was also an opportunity for the incumbent regime and powerful factions to monopolise the country’s resources and hinder all forms of a transparent democratic reform: this was widely recognised by academics and in the public sphere.

The suspension of the electoral process was accompanied by massive human rights violations against civilians, including FIS activists. It extended to people who publicly expressed their opposition to state policies without showing any support for the Islamist opposition. The state detained thousands in concentration camps in the south of the country under a variety of politically motivated charges.8 Meanwhile, others were executed or died under torture.

1.2.Second Phase: Mass Recruitment and the Militarisation of the Society :

After the interruption of the electoral process, Algeria witnessed a growth in Islamic armed groups and the militarization of society. The expansion of human rights violations provided a fertile ground for Islamist armed groups to recruit youths and radicalise communities.10 Indeed, the military intervention gave space to hard-liners inside the FIS, who saw violence as the only alternative for achieving their political objectives and for establishing an Islamic State (‘Dawla Islamiya’). State institutions, staff, and even people who opposed the use of violence were targeted by the Islamist insurgency.11 Then, on the other side of the conflict, since the end of 1993, new pro-government forces emerged in Algeria to fight the Islamist insurgency. Unlike the self-appointed pro-government troops that had autonomy in conflict zones, these forces were highly centralised and were totally under state control. Many reasons were given to explain the appearance of these groups: the total absence of security; protection provisions; enforced recruitment; personal grievances; the search for power and selfenrichment; and poverty. Nonetheless, there is a consensus that the state also played a crucial role in increasing militarisation, which was considered a way to strengthen the government’s hands against insurgents. Remarkable efforts were made to augment recruitment. The regime broadcast announcements on official media calling people to help the government and to fight alongside state forces. Furthermore, in rural zones where citizens were more vulnerable to violence, people were compelled to join these forces. The pro-government forces in Algeria were divided into two structures: the Patriots and the Communal Guards. The Patriots or what was called the self-defense forces appeared in 1993. There were estimated officially to be about 170,000 members.12 It is claimed that the first groups appeared in Tizi Ouzou mountain villages where insurgents used to go to collect food and money. Residents asked for arms from the regime to protect themselves and their properties from the insurgents. The Patriots were not properly autonomous. Instead, they were dependent on the Defense Ministry and worked closely with the military operational sector. Moreover, they were geographically rooted. Most of them prioritised the safety of their own area and their families. The second division of the pro-government irregular forces was the Communal Guards, who were dependent on the Interior Ministry. They were forces with regular salaries and worked in close connection with the brigade and the police. Due to the economic crisis, this recruitment program provided socioeconomic advancement for many impoverished young men during the war.13 The first groups were set up early in 1994. They were set out in cities and abandoned villages where they were charged with patrolling state institutions; protecting state officers and politicians and fighting alongside the army in the mountain villages. They were stationed in destroyed schools and empty state buildings and provided protection in many peripheral zones.

1.3. Third Phase: Massacres against Civilians:

 After 1996, the war was more complex and brutal. It became fragmented, multipolar, and loyalties blurred. Two factors explain this change. First, the emergence of pro-government forces forced a profound fragmentation within communities. The locally-driven forms of social solidarity and the cognitive concepts of proximity, including clans and big family, started to break down. Then, the social fabric and the traditional societal hierarchies that structured social solidarity between communities and individuals were badly damaged. Different members of the same family could support the regime and armed Islamists. The second factor was the emergence of extremist doctrines within both belligerent camps. On the one hand, new armed Islamist groups appeared considering society as a whole to be ‘infidel’ (‘kafir’) and seeking a new societal system. On the other hand, powerful clans inside the establishment adopted more radical speech demonising all religious symbols and opponents of the regime. The result was a large-scale campaign of violence against civilians. In 1996-1997, Algeria witnessed massacres in different prefectures, especially in cities surrounding the capital and in the western part of the country. Thousands of civilian people, including children, were slaughtered.14 It is alleged in the official narrative that massacres were a response to the announcement of the electoral process by President Liamine Zeroual in 1995.15 Armed groups proclaimed in published communiqués that those elections were not legitimate and they were attempting to deter people from participating in the polls. In contrast, a ‘dirty war’ hypothesis emerged among academics and refugees in exile.16 For instance, the military rulers had been accused of passivity and collusion with extremist groups after hundreds of men, women and children had been slaughtered in a single night a short distance from an army barrack. Even the AIS leadership maintained that massacres presented a stateled strategy to discredit the Islamist opposition.